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This paper studies gender heterogeneity in preferences. We used experimental 
methods to elicit the subjective discount rate and attitude toward risk in Indian 
villages. Results show that women made more patient choices than men and that 
their discount rate is related to number of children. No gender difference is found 
for individuals without children. Women’s discount rate declines up to four 
children, whereas men’s does not decline. Our findings suggest that conflictual 
interactions within a household are more likely when a couple has young children, 
and hence, spousal heterogeneity in patience is at its greatest.  
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own. I.  Introduction 
The idea that men and women have heterogeneous preferences has been a cornerstone of a 
growing literature on intra-household resource allocation. Many empirical observations of 
behavior in various contexts support the view that women often make more development-
germane choices than men
1. It has been reported that a greater income share in the hands of 
women leads to higher child survival probability (Thomas, 1990), enhances anthropometric 
status of girls (Duflo, 2003), increases educational expenditures (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 
2003), and reduces the budget shares of alcohol and cigarettes (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995)
2. 
The experience of microfinance institutions gives women an equally favorable record. 
Armendá riz and Morduch (2005) provide numerous examples of substantially lower repayment 
difficulties for women compared to men. Pitt and Khandker (1998) report a larger positive 
effect of microcredit on schooling and household assets when women are participants.  
What drives these behavioral differences remains unclear, however. It could be that 
women are more patient, have fewer self-control difficulties, are more risk averse, or simply 
feel more concern about others.
3 Muhammad Yunus (2002, p.374), for example, mentions all 
these components of the utility function in his explanation of the positive experience of the 
Grameen Bank with women: “… women have a longer vision than men. Men are more likely to 
enjoy what they’ ve got right away, and they are generally more impulsive. But a woman is 
more likely to have a very consistent vision for the future. She wants a better life and to build 
security for her and for her family.”  Moreover, we do not know if the preference heterogeneity 
between genders is immutable or if it varies throughout the lifetime and could be explained by 
observable economic characteristic or family background.  
Lab experiments organized in the field can be a powerful tool to shed light on these 
questions and complement the literature on intra-household decision-making, which is 
primarily concerned with the bargaining process within the household and assumes preference 
heterogeneity. Our study applies an experimental methodology in field labs
4 organized in 
villages in Karnataka, India, to elicit individual time discounting and attitude toward risk on a 
sample of more than 500 individuals. We complemented the experimental responses with a 
                                                 
1 This idea also affected policy. For example, the conditional cash transfers (PROGRESA) in Mexico are given to 
women and many microfinance initiatives are specifically targeted at women.  
2 For a surveying article on intra-household models and evidence, see Xu (2007). 
3 Complementary to our paper is a study of Ashraf (2005) whose experiments in the Philippines show that 
contextual differences have substantial effect on intra-household decisions and may potentially exacerbate the 
intrinsic differences in preferences. 
4 Artefactual field experiments using the classification of Harrison and List (2004).   2 
detailed survey of individual economic and demographic characteristics. We find significant 
gender differences in the level of patience, but not in the likelihood of having hyperbolic time 
preferences (being more impatient now than in the future) or attitude toward risk. In 
accordance with the observed patterns of behavior mentioned above, women emerged more 
patient than men in making choices between current tradeoffs and future tradeoffs.
5 
Interestingly, the observed gender heterogeneity in patience is closely related with the number 
of children in a family. 
In developed countries, many economic experiments are conducted using the student 
population. Although some studies identify gender differences in subjective discount rate (e.g. 
Kirby and Marakovic, 1996), for obvious reasons, this setting is not conducive to studying a 
link based on the number of children. Studies conducted by psychologists capture a wider 
variety of populations and the overall conclusion (Silverman 2003) is that women are better 
able than men to delay gratification. A few interesting studies in developing countries 
measured individual time discounting, although they did not focus on gender differences. 
Rubalcava et al. (2007) in Mexico and Ashraf et al. (2006) in the Philippines find that women 
are more patient than men; on the other hand Tanaka et al. (2007) in Vietnam and Pender 
(1996) in India do not find this relationship. 
The remainder of this brief paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the 
sample and experimental methodology. Section 3 summarizes the main results. Section 4 
discusses alternative explanations for the observed pattern and Section 5 concludes. 
 
II.  Sample and experimental methodology 
The selection procedure was designed to generate an unusually varied sample of the rural 
population of the south-western Indian state of Karnataka. Data were collected in June 2007 in 
cooperation with the Indian NGO, BPKS
6 in Honavar and Haliyal taluks, (an administrative 
unit akin to a county, part of a larger district within a state). Figure 1 provides a map. Nine 
villages were selected from each taluk and in each village, 35 people older than fifteen years 
                                                 
5 During the experimental meetings the participants were given a lunch. Notably in this context, the majority of 
women did not eat the meal, but waited until the end of the session and brought it home to share it with their 
children. Men ate the lunch immediately. 
6 BPKS is an Indian NGO whose mission is to support education for needy children. The organization was 
founded in 1991 and administers a child sponsorship program (school fees, uniforms and health care) for 5 000 
children in northern Karnataka using funding from donors in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, the 
Netherlands and Belgium.   3 
were selected using a random walk method.
7 Those identified were invited to participate in the 
study, and 90 percent participated.  Of the total number of 573 participants, there were no 
fewer than 25 from each village. 
We used village meeting halls, typically schools, as field labs. Table 1 compares the 
sample characteristics with 2001 Karnataka census averages restricted to the population older 
than 15 years. Average age and education levels are not statistically different, but our sample 
has a higher proportion of married respondents (79 percent as compared to 67 percent in the 
entire state). This may reflect higher age of marriage in the urban areas included in the 
Karnataka average, while our respondents are villagers and therefore more likely to be married. 
Although the selection strategy was not intended to generate a sample representative of the 
entire rural Karnataka population, it captures most of its variety and in our opinion is 
exceptional for an experimental study with real rewards. 
We employed a simple protocol to elicit discount rates, drawing on practices common 
in developed and developing countries (e.g. Harrison et al., 2002; Tanaka et al., 2007).
8 
Respondents were asked to choose between receiving a smaller monetary amount earlier in 
time or a larger amount with a three months delay. For example: “Do you prefer Rs. 250 
tomorrow or Rs. 300 three months later?”
9 We posed five such questions to each individual, 
each question increasing the future amount while keeping the earlier amount constant.  Thus, 
we made the choice to delay increasingly more attractive in each subsequent binary choice. 
The point at which an individual switched from choosing the earlier reward to the future 
reward gives an interval of her discount rate. In the analysis we use the arithmetic means of 
these intervals to approximate individual discount rates. If a participant switched more than 
once, nothing could be inferred about the discount rate and the observation was excluded from 
the analysis.
10 
                                                 
7 The villages were randomly selected based on the 2001 Indian Census database. In three villages in each taluk , 
however, the BPKS did not have good access to or knowledge of the village head. These villages were replaced 
with others that were similar in size, distance to town and educational facilities to the ones originally selected.  
8 In their surveying article, Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) classify this methodology as the “choice task method.”  
For a discussion on relative advantages of using “choices task method”  vs. alternative “matching-task method”  see 
Frederick, et al. (2002). Our decision was largely made for simplicity given the low education levels in the area. 
9 In July 2007 the exchange rate was 1USD= 40.2 Indian Rupees. In the area of our study Rs. 250 is 
approximately a week’ s wage. 
10 There were five percent of inconsistent responses, which are uncorrelated with observable characteristics. An 
additional four respondents did not answer other questions of interest. Both sets of respondents were excluded 
from the analysis, leaving a final sample size of 540 individuals.   4 
The same series of binary choices were made at a further time frame: “Do you prefer 
Rs. 250 in one year time or Rs. 300 in one year and three months?”  The time frame was shifted 
by exactly one year to avoid the possibility of confounding factors due to the seasonality of 
agricultural incomes or the regularity of local celebrations. For a complete list of binary 
choices involved, see Table 2. We denote the discount rate calculated from the current 
tradeoffs as the current discount rate, and that calculated from the future tradeoffs as the future 
discount rate. 
We applied the front-end-delay method (Harrison et al., 2005; Pender, 1996) in the 
earlier time frame to control for potential confounds due to lower credibility and higher 
transaction costs associated with future payments. If participants lacked confidence that they 
would receive a reward in the future, they might tend to prefer the current reward irrespective 
of their actual discount rate. Therefore, no choices included payments on the day of the 
experimental session so that all rewards faced a similar “credibility discount” . The future 
payments were guaranteed by cash certificates signed by the chief of the NGO, a local leader 
and a social worker familiar to the community.  
To elicit aversion to risk we used a close replication of the simple protocol designed by 
Binswanger (1980) for peasants in ICRISAT villages and later used by Barr (2003) in 
Zimbabwe, among others. Each participant was asked to select one of six different gambles. 
Every gamble yielded either a high or a low payoff with a probability of 0.5.  In each 
subsequent gamble the expected value increased jointly with the variance, allowing us to assign 
a degree of risk aversion.
11 Two sets of prizes were used. The first one was set at the level of 
amounts studied in the discount rate questions. The expected value of the least risky gamble 
was Rs. 250 and the higher payoff in the most risky gamble was Rs. 1000. The second set of 
prizes was lower, with the expected value of Rs. 30 for the least risky gamble and with the 
maximum payoff of Rs. 120 in the most risky gamble. The exact numbers for all the gambles 
are in Table 3. 
Given the high proportion of illiterate respondents, much care was devoted to ensuring that 
participants correctly understood the experimental choices. Ten trained research assistants 
helped the illiterate respondents complete the questionnaire. Before the experimental choices 
were made, all rules were explained publicly. The experimenter also explained the principle of 
                                                 
11 We did not impose any particular structure on the individual utility function to derive an index of risk aversion. 
Instead, we labeled the gambles from 1 to 6, where 6 is the most risky gamble.   5 
cash certificates and simulated the randomization procedure based on simple tossing of ping-
pong balls. At the end of the session 20 percent of randomly selected respondents were paid or 
received certificates according to one of their choices.  
III.  Results 
Table 4 presents the means and the standard deviations of subjective discount rates, likelihood 
of having hyperbolic preferences and attitude toward risk.  Women are on average more risk 
averse, although the difference is not significant at any reasonable level. Adding controls for 
economic characteristics and family background does not change this result (not reported). We 
do observe substantial difference in the level of subjective discount rates. The current 3-months 
discount rate for men is 27.2%, whereas for women it is 21.6%. For the future discount rate the 
averages are 22.5% and 15.9%, respectively. For both discount rates the differences are 
significant at the 1% level. Similarly to Ashraf et al. (2006), we consider a person as having 
hyperbolic time preferences if her current subjective discount rate is greater than her future 
discount rate.
12 One third of our respondents are more impatient now than in the future and 
hence more likely to face self-control difficulties. We do not observe any significant gender 
difference in the likelihood of having hyperbolic preferences. This result holds with or without 
adding controls. 
Tables 5 and 7 show how the discount rates are correlated with observable 
characteristics. First, we consider economic characteristics such as education, wealth, income 
and income fluctuations that are traditionally regarded as determinants of patience (Becker and 
Mulligan, 1997; Kirby et al., 2002; Tanaka et al., 2007). We find that more educated men are 
significantly more patient. For women, we also find a negative correlation with respect to 
education, although it is not statistically significant.
13 None of the other economic 
characteristics is correlated with women’ s patience. 
Next we explore the relationship between subjective discount rates and family 
characteristics. For women, we find a u-shaped relationship with respect to number of children.
 
                                                 
12 There are possible explanations other than hyperbolic preferences for why we observe more impatient choices 
with regard to current tradeoffs than for future tradeoffs, such as noise in the data, confusion of respondents or 
differential transaction costs and credibility of future payments. This issue is dealt with in bigger detail in other 
paper (Bauer et al., 2008), where it is shown that financial strategies of people with hyperbolic preferences 
comply with the predictions of psychological models and demand for commitment. We skip this discussion here, 
where the gender difference in the probability of having hyperbolic preferences is statistically insignificant. 
13 This finding may also be due to lower variance in women’ s education, as 45.1% of women in our sample are 
illiterate, compared to 34.2% of men.   6 
In Figure 2 or Table 5 we observe that women without children younger than 18 years
14 have a 
current three-month discount rate of 25.1%, with one child 20.3%, and reach a minimum of 
14.4% with four children. In our sample there are only eleven women who have more than four 
children younger than 18 years. These women seem to be overloaded by the needs of a large 
family in a sense that they need money immediately to satisfy the basic needs of the high 
number of children, and their discount rate ascends steeply to 30.6%.  
This result could be due to other variables. In Table 7 we control for all other variables, 
in Table 8 we do the same for a sub-sample of married individuals.
15 We use a set of dummies, 
each for a different number of young children, to allow for a non-linear relationship. Our 
results (Table 7, columns 2 and 5) indicate the same u-shaped pattern for women as the simple 
averages; the effects are even more pronounced for married women (Table 8, columns 2 and 
5). 
It is interesting to note the small difference in the discount rates between men and 
women who do not have young children. With more children, the discount rates start to diverge 
as women’ s patience increases, whereas there is no such effect on men’ s patience (Figures 2 
and 3). Having three or four young children, the difference is more than 10 percentage points 
for both the current and future average discount rate (for three children, the difference is 
significant at 1%; for four children, the difference is significant at 5%).  
Columns 1 and 4 in Table 7 are ambitious in attempting to tease out gender difference 
by interacting the dummies for number of young children with being a female. Again, the 
interaction coefficients suggest that the heterogeneity in discount rates between men and 
women increases with the additional young children up to three, and the difference also 
remains high for larger numbers of children, although it is not always significant. The 
interaction coefficients for having three or four children are slightly larger (around 15 
percentage points) than the differences inferred from simple averages. Again, the effects 
described are even stronger for a sub-sample of married individuals (Table 8, columns 1 and 
4).  
                                                 
14 Although it may sound as an unnecessary adjective, we will use a shorter term “young children”  
interchangeably with “children younger than 18 years” . It should distinguish them from the total number of 
children (including adults). 
15 The reported regression results are based on OLS with standard errors clustered at the village level.  We have 
performed several robustness checks. First, we have tested the sensitivity of results on village fixed effects, and 
very similar results were found. Secondly, the results could potentially be driven by calculation of discount rate 
values as arithmetic means of the inferred ranges. Using geometric means or ordered probit does not affect 
patterns discussed in the paper (not reported).   7 
In line with numerous observations about differential treatment of sons and daughters in 
India, the association of discounting with children could be gender specific. For example, the 
dowry system may motivate parents to be more patient after having a daughter. Deolalikar and 
Rose (1998) show positive impact of a daughter relative to a son on household savings. In 
Table 8, instead of the number of children, we include indicator variables for the number of 
daughters and sons separately. The coefficients are negative for both. When the dependent 
variable is the future discount rate, women with two sons or two daughters are significantly 
more patient than women who do not have any children. For the current discount rate, the 
coefficients are statistically significant only for sons. These results suggest that the motivation 
to save for a dowry can only be part of the story behind the low discount rates of women with 
young children.  
In order to assess the predictive power of our experimental measures, we examine 
several types of behavior and preferences outside the lab that one would expect to be closely 
linked to patience. The results are intuitively plausible. In Table 11 we show that higher 
patience predicts higher savings, higher likelihood of participation in self-help groups (local 
microfinance organizations), higher likelihood of having a future-oriented purpose for savings 
and greater desired level of schooling for children.  
 
IV.  Patience and number of children: alternative explanations 
Let us consider why a woman with young children might emerge as more forward-looking. 
Being a parent may influence how people think about future, a proposition that we have 
emphasized so far. This relationship is predicted, for example, by the model of backward 
discounting with dual selves (Ray and Wang, 2001). It is also consistent with a situation when 
parents need to save for a certain high return investment opportunity that is available 
specifically to children, such as education. Alternatively, there may be a causal effect in the 
opposite direction; being patient may affect the number of children one would prefer to have. 
Or there could be an unobserved variable causing both. Our results - if interpreted as the causal 
effect of children - may be potentially biased due to considering children an investment, 
differences in outside opportunities available to men and women, life cycle effects and 
measurement error in wealth. Below we discuss the plausibility of these alternative 
explanations.    8 
Following the traditional assumption of Becker and Tomes (1976) about altruistic 
parents, one could argue that more patient parents put greater weight on the quality of their 
children in the form of investment in their human capital. Since higher quality children are 
costly, more patient parents should prefer to have fewer children. In this case, our estimates of 
children’ s effect on subjective discount rates would be biased downwards. On the other hand, if 
parents were selfish
16 they might consider children a form of investment in better care for their 
old age. In this case, patient individuals should want more children and our estimates would be 
biased upwards. 
Although we do not have an exogenous source of variation in fertility to test a causal 
effect on women’ s patience, we believe our results suggest that the downward-sloping part of 
the observed u-shape is not driven by patience causing a higher number of children. If children 
were an investment for old age we should observe a closer connection between patience and 
total number of children than between patience and young children.  
In Table 10 the dependent variable is again the subjective discount rate, the sample is 
restricted to women and we focus on comparison of the results for total number of children and 
children younger than 18 years. In column 2, it is shown that the u-shape is much stronger for 
young children than for total number of children. A negative relationship could still exist, 
however, between the discount rate and total number of children, perhaps masked by the fact 
that women with more than four children become impatient by being overwhelmed by current 
needs. To control for this effect we include a dummy for having more than four young children 
(Table 10, columns 3 and 4). The negative coefficient is much stronger for young children. A 
similar exercise on the future discount rate produces qualitatively similar results, although of 
less statistical significance (Table 10, columns 5-8). 
Another possible explanation of gender heterogeneity in the level of the discount rates 
could be related to different outside opportunities faced by men and women. If men intended to 
use the experimental rewards for a profitable investment and women with young children were 
less likely to do so, then women might opt for choices that make them look more patient. 
Contrary to this argument, our findings show that impatient men are more likely to save for 
consumption rather than for investment purposes (Table 11). Furthermore, if certain social 
norms prevented women from undertaking a profitable investment we would expect women 
                                                 
16 The level of altruism/selfishness reflects the extent to which a person includes utility of her child into her own 
utility function.   9 
with stronger decision-making power to make more impatient choices in our experiment. No 
clear relationship emerges between women’ s discount rate and a measure of the women’ s 
position within a household
17 (p-value=0.56, resp. 0.87 for current, resp. future discount rate) 
or with being a head of household (p-value=1.00, resp. 0.41 for current, resp. future discount 
rate). 
Since number of children is tied to different stages of life cycle, the effect of children 
might be overestimated if it captured unobserved life cycle effects. For example, Becker and 
Mulligan (1997) predict a u-shaped relationship between age and patience due to the effects of 
learning to be future-oriented during youth and recognition of shortening life expectancy 
during aging. If the first effect overlapped with children being born and the second one with 
children becoming adults, we could also observe a positive correlation between number of 
young children and patience. We do not, however, observe statistically significant relationship 
between age and the discount rate for women even if we do not control for number of children 
(Table 10, columns 5 and 10). 
Although the wealth index in our analysis is based on wide range of information about 
household assets, it is commonly argued that measures of wealth are particularly vulnerable to 
measurement error. Since the number of children is likely to be measured more precisely, we 
might be concerned about the regression coefficient of number of children being biased 
upwards if richer women had more children. In contrast, wealthier women in our sample have 
fewer children (the correlation coefficient is negative and significant at 1%). 
 
V. Conclusions 
We conducted a series of lab experiments in the field on time discounting and attitude toward 
risk in eighteen villages in India to study preference heterogeneity between men and women. 
We have not found any significant differences in attitude toward risk or the likelihood of 
having hyperbolic time preferences. In accordance with the earlier empirical work of others 
who observe more future-oriented use of income if in the hands of women, we find 
significantly lower subjective discount rates for women.  
                                                 
17 An index based on thirteen questions from Demographic and Health Surveys on decision-making power and 
attitudes about wife beating was used as a proxy of women’ s position with a household.   10 
Our findings suggest that gender differences in patience are not constant over a lifetime. 
Men and women have similar discount rates if they have no children, but the preference 
heterogeneity emerges when there are young children in the family. We find a strong u-shaped 
pattern between patience and the number of children women currently have, whereas men’ s 
patience is not very sensitive to the number of children.  
We provide several arguments about why we believe our results indicate a causal effect 
of children on how women think about the future, although additional work needs to be done to 
establish this link more clearly. Panel data with experimental measures of patience for the same 
individuals in different stages of life would be particularly suitable. 
The observed positive effect of children on women’ s patience is consistent with the 
psychological model of backward discounting with dual selves (Ray and Wang, 2001), where a 
parent maximizes, besides her own utility, the utility of her children positioned in the parent’ s 
stage of life. The well-known saying “I want my child to have a better life than I have”  nicely 
illustrates parental concern about a child imprinted into their position. Alternatively, parents 
may become more patient if there are children-specific investments with high fixed costs and 
high return.  
The findings may inform the growing literature that studies intra-household decision-
making and strategies to cope with conflictual spending preferences of spouses in developing 
countries. For example, Anderson and Baland (2002) show that married women who earn an 
independent income are more likely to participate in rotating saving and credit associations 
(ROSCAs). They argue that women use the group commitment to save as a way to protect their 
savings against claims of their husbands for immediate consumption.  Our findings suggest that 
strategies that aim to discipline divergent preferences of the spouses may be correlated not only 
with marital status and decision-making power. These actions should be more likely when a 
couple has young children; hence spousal heterogeneity in patience is likely to be at its 
greatest. 
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Figure 1: Geographical location of Honavar and Haliyal Taluks 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics and comparison with Karnataka averages (means and 
standard deviations) 
Total Female Male Honavar Haliyal Karnataka*
Age (years) 36.869 35.537 38.180 36.852 36.885 36.300
(11.740) (11.273) (12.061) (11.015) (12.443)
Education (classes) 4.244 3.485 4.993 5.970 2.519 4.200
(4.433) (4.041) (4.675) (4.474) (3.658)
Illiterate 0.396 0.451 0.342 0.204 0.589 0.425
(0.490) (0.499) (0.475) (0.403) (0.493)
Married 0.789 0.780 0.798 0.733 0.844 0.670
(0.408) (0.415) (0.402) (0.443) (0.363)
Farmer 0.703 0.669 0.737 0.643 0.772 0.750**
(0.457) (0.471) (0.441) (0.483) (0.420)
Sample size 540 268 272 270 270  
Note: Means, standard deviations in parentheses.  
*Source: Indian Census 2001: data for the Karnataka population aged 15 and above.  
**Only rural population. 
 
 
Table 2: Eliciting discount rates (payoffs) 
Tomorrow
After three 
months After one year
After one year 
and three 
choice 1 250 265 choice 1 250 265
choice 2 250 280 choice 2 250 280
choice 3 250 300 choice 3 250 300
choice 4 250 330 choice 4 250 330
choice 5 250 375 choice 5 250 375




Table 3: Eliciting attitude toward risk (payoffs) 
Prospect
Bad luck payoff 
(50%)
Good luck payoff 
(50%) Prospect
Bad luck payoff 
(50%)
Good luck payoff 
(50%)
1 30 30 1 250 250
2 27 57 2 225 475
3 24 72 3 200 600
4 18 90 4 150 750
5 6 114 5 50 950
6 0 120 6 0 1000
Attitude to risk (low amount) Attitude to risk (high amount)
   17 
Table 4: Preferences and gender 
Total
Female Male
Current discount rate 0.244 0.216 0.272 ***
(0.227) (0.211) (0.239)
Future discount rate 0.192 0.159 0.225 ***
(0.221) (0.194) (0.240)
Hyperbolic preferences 0.330 0.343 0.316
(0.471) (0.476) (0.466)
Attitude to risk (low amount) 3.854 3.776 3.930
(1.548) (1.566) (1.529)




Note: Means, standard deviations in parentheses.  
***Gender difference of means significant at 1% (t-test).   18
Table 5: Discount rates and socioeconomic characteristics  
young old low high low high 0 1 2 3 4 above 4
Female
Current discount rate 0.202 0.232 0.239 0.189 ** 0.238 0.195 * 0.251 0.203 0.223 0.183 * 0.144 ** 0.306
(0.205) (0.218) (0.224) (0.192) (0.219) (0.202) (0.231) (0.198) (0.212) (0.198) (0.121) (0.284)
Future discount rate 0.164 0.153 0.179 0.135 0.183 0.136 ** 0.168 0.152 0.211 0.109 ** 0.137 0.196
(0.203) (0.184) (0.210) (0.170) (0.207) (0.177) (0.198) (0.204) (0.223) (0.133) (0.177) (0.260)
Number of observations 145 123 147 121 134 134 86 32 52 59 28 11
Male
Current discount rate 0.261 0.283 0.340 0.198 *** 0.309 0.234 *** 0.264 0.209 0.270 0.294 0.258 0.414 **
(0.242) (0.237) (0.253) (0.199) (0.248) (0.225) (0.240) (0.214) (0.239) (0.235) (0.250) (0.260)
Future discount rate 0.232 0.218 0.292 0.153 *** 0.264 0.185 *** 0.193 0.200 0.240 0.209 0.269 0.396 ***
(0.247) (0.233) (0.266) (0.183) (0.258) (0.213) (0.222) (0.232) (0.244) (0.232) (0.263) (0.283)
Number of observations 139 133 141 131 137 135 93 30 53 52 30 14
Education Wealth Number of children 0-18 years old Age
 
 
Note: Means, standard deviations in parentheses. Difference of means (t-test): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In t-test the mean discount rate 
for particular number of children is always compared to the mean when having no children. In the first two columns respondents are divided into two groups: those of below 
median age (young) and those of above median age (old).  Similarly, respondents are divided into below/above median education groups and into below/above median wealth 
groups.   19 
Table 6: Definition of variables 
Variables Definition Mean Std 
dev
Experimental choices
6 values approximating 3-months discount rate in earlier time frame:
0.03 = if discount rate < 6%; 0.09= if6% < discount rate < 12%; 0.16
if 12% < discount rate < 20%; 0.26 = if 20% < discount rate < 32%,
0.14 if 32% < discount rate < 50%; 0.6= if 50% < discount rate
6 values approximating 3-months discount rate in delayed time frame:
0.03 = if discount rate < 6%; 0.09= if6% < discount rate < 12%; 0.16
if 12% < discount rate < 20%; 0.26 = if 20% < discount rate < 32%,
0.14 if 32% < discount rate < 50%; 0.6= if 50% < discount rate
Hyperbolic preferences Dummy; 1 = if current discount rate > future discount rate 0.330 0.471
Attitude to risk (low amount) 6 values approximating attitude to risk depending on the gamble
selected:
3.854 1.548
1 = (30,30); 2 = (27,57); 3 = (24,72); 4 = (18,90); 5 = (6,114); 6 =
(0,120)
Attitude to risk (high amount) 6 values approximating attitude to risk depending on the gamble
selected:
3.843 1.538
1 = (250,250); 2 = (225,475); 3 = (200,600); 4 = (150,750); 5 =
(50,950); 6 = (0,1000)
Socioeconomic characteristics
Children Number of children younger than 18 years 1.798 1.605
1 child Dummy; 1 = if 1 child younger than 18 years 0.115 0.319
2 children Dummy; 1 = if 2 children younger than 18 years 0.194 0.396
3 children Dummy; 1 = if 3 children younger than 18 years 0.206 0.404
4 children  Dummy; 1 = if 4 children younger than 18 years 0.107 0.310
> 4 children Dummy; 1 = if more than 4 children younger than 18 years 0.046 0.210
Total number of children Total number of children ever born to respondent  2.865 2.081
Desired children Desired number of children 3.555 0.645
Female Dummy; 1 = female; 0 = male 0.496 0.500
Age Age minus average age of marriage (21.8). 15.105 11.740
Education Years of schooling completed 4.244 4.433
Married Dummy; 1 = married; 0 = single or widow 0.789 0.408
Wealth Wealth index calculated by principal component analyses from
questions on type of house, electricity connection, land ownership and
dummies for possesion of 14 types of household equipment
0.000 1.895
Income in June < income in Sept. Dummy; 1 = if income in June < income in September; 0 = if income in 
June >= income in September
0.494 0.500
Financial behavior
Total savings (Rs. th.) Rs. th. (savings in bank + savings in post office + SHG monthly
contribution*average length of participation + home savings)
2.540 5.431
Future-oriented purpose of savings Dummy; 1 = if the major purpose of savings is future-oriented
(agricultural investment, business, education, doctor); 0 = if it focuses
on current consumption (celebration, personal items, household
equipment)
0.546 0.498
SHG participation Dummy; 1 = if participant of a self-help group; 0 = if not 0.429 0.495
Desired education of first-born boy Years of schooling reported as desirable for first-born son 12.894 2.300
Desired education of first-born girl Years of schooling reported as desirable for first-born daughter 12.113 2.680
Current discount rate 0.244 0.228
Future discount rate 0.192 0.221
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Table 7: Determinants of current and future discount rate (whole sample) 
Dependent variable
All Women Men All Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.053 -0.076
(0.066) (0.045)
Education -0.013 -0.008 -0.017 -0.014 -0.007 -0.020
(0.003)*** (0.005) (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.004)***
Age -0.011 8.3e-04 -0.012 -0.012 -2.6e-04 -0.014
(0.005)* (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)*** (0.003) (0.004)***
Age * Female 0.012 0.011
(0.007)* (0.005)**
(Age)
2/1000 0.267 -0.076 0.263 0.247 -0.057 0.259
(0.110)** (0.099) (0.130)* (0.073)*** (0.071) (0.080)***
(Age)
2/1000 * Female -0.351 -0.303
(0.143)** (0.105)**
Wealth -0.001 -2.2e-04 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Income in June < income in Sept. -0.015 0.016 -0.044 -0.022 0.006 -0.048
(0.025) (0.026) (0.036) (0.023) (0.029) (0.031)
Married 0.081 0.078 0.084 0.056 0.048 0.075
(0.041)* (0.050) (0.080) (0.047) (0.052) (0.071)
1 child -0.067 -0.086 -0.076 0.009 -0.045 -0.003
(0.063) (0.047)* (0.059) (0.050) (0.039) (0.048)
2 children -0.019 -0.082 -0.033 0.042 0.003 0.026
(0.045) (0.046)* (0.042) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042)
3 children 0.021 -0.129 0.009 0.026 -0.106 0.010
(0.062) (0.047)** (0.059) (0.055) (0.049)** (0.059)
4 children -0.040 -0.179 -0.062 0.059 -0.085 0.034
(0.088) (0.045)*** (0.090) (0.073) (0.058) (0.072)
> 4 children 0.119 -0.003 0.098 0.189 -0.012 0.162
(0.074) (0.107) (0.061) (0.090)* (0.127) (0.097)
1 child * Female -0.028 -0.064
(0.087) (0.068)
2 children * Female -0.070 -0.046
(0.064) (0.069)
3 children * Female -0.161 -0.143
(0.088)* (0.073)*
4 children * Female -0.148 -0.153
(0.092) (0.090)
> 4 children * Female -0.131 -0.211
(0.147) (0.139)
Constant 0.358 0.261 0.407 0.331 0.202 0.388
(0.044)*** (0.059)*** (0.056)*** (0.036)*** (0.047)*** (0.052)***
Observations 540 268 272 540 268 272
R-squared 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.18
Current discount rate Future discount rate
 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS. Standard errors corrected for 
clustering at the village level. In columns 1,2,3 the dependent variable is current discount rate calculated 
from the binary choices between amount tomorrow and after three months. In columns 4,5,6 the dependent 
variable is future discount rate calculated from the binary choices between amount after one year and after 
one year and three months. The omitted variable is “no children” . The variable age equals to actual age 
minus the average age of marriage 21.8. All the coefficients are intact by this shift except the female 
dummy, which is now easier to interpret as a gender difference at the age of marriage instead of a gender 
difference at the time of birth.   21 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.047 -0.099
(0.128) (0.079)
Education -0.011 -0.006 -0.016 -0.013 -0.006 -0.020
(0.004)*** (0.006) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.005)***
Age -0.018 -0.007 -0.017 -0.018 -0.006 -0.017





2/1000 * Female 0.378 0.102 0.355 0.345 0.073 0.319
(0.115)*** (0.125) (0.119)*** (0.060)*** (0.110) (0.068)***
(Age)
2 * Female -0.302 -0.302
(0.196) (0.140)**
Wealth 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.004 -0.002 0.014
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Income in June < income in Sept. -0.017 0.011 -0.045 -0.031 0.004 -0.067
(0.030) (0.038) (0.040) (0.028) (0.036) (0.038)*
1 child -0.090 -0.126 -0.084 -0.015 -0.050 -0.005
(0.064) (0.064)* (0.066) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
2 children -0.025 -0.134 -0.025 0.029 -0.032 0.032
(0.047) (0.052)** (0.047) (0.046) (0.053) (0.042)
3 children 0.019 -0.185 0.017 0.017 -0.143 0.017
(0.064) (0.055)*** (0.063) (0.063) (0.060)** (0.061)
4 children -0.037 -0.211 -0.045 0.052 -0.107 0.045
(0.090) (0.049)*** (0.092) (0.077) (0.059)* (0.075)
> 4 children 0.119 -0.068 0.109 0.181 -0.074 0.169
(0.063)* (0.094) (0.061)* (0.094)* (0.106) (0.094)*
1 child * Female -0.032 -0.030
(0.091) (0.082)
2 children * Female -0.103 -0.052
(0.070) (0.078)
3 children * Female -0.200 -0.154
(0.085)** (0.091)
4 children * Female -0.170 -0.150
(0.101) (0.098)
> 4 children * Female -0.186 -0.252
(0.116) (0.132)*
Constant 0.510 0.439 0.540 0.455 0.322 0.496
(0.079)*** (0.084)*** (0.081)*** (0.055)*** (0.066)*** (0.055)***
Observations 426 209 217 426 209 217
R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.18
Current discount rate Future discount rate
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS. Standard errors corrected for 
clustering at the village level. In columns 1,2,3 the dependent variable is current discount rate calculated 
from the binary choices between amount tomorrow and after three months. In columns 4,5,6 the dependent 
variable is future discount rate calculated from the binary choices between amount after one year and after 
one year and three months. The omitted variable is “no children” . The variable age equals to actual age 
minus the average age of marriage 21.8. All the coefficients are intact by this shift except the female 
dummy, which is now easier to interpret as a gender difference at the age of marriage instead of a gender 
difference at the time of birth. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006
(0.005)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.001 -0.014 0.003 -0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009)
(Age)
2/1000 -0.036 0.137 -0.063 0.056
(0.113) (0.133) (0.079) (0.117)
Wealth 0.002 0.007 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Relative income 0.016 0.012 0.002 -3.9e-04
(0.026) (0.037) (0.028) (0.036)
Married 0.065 0.053
(0.051) (0.054)
1 son below 18 years -0.047 -0.058 0.002 -0.004
(0.049) (0.050) (0.031) (0.033)
2 sons below 18 years -0.098 -0.121 -0.065 -0.080
(0.038)** (0.035)*** (0.034)* (0.036)**
>2 sons below 18 years -0.139 -0.164 -0.063 -0.075
(0.053)** (0.059)** (0.057) (0.065)
1 daughter below 18 years -0.030 -0.057 -0.020 -0.037
(0.028) (0.042) (0.031) (0.034)
2 daughters below 18 years -0.017 -0.023 -0.082 -0.093
(0.044) (0.052) (0.037)** (0.040)**
>2 daughters below 18 years -0.025 -0.055 -0.027 -0.059
(0.068) (0.059) (0.063) (0.053)
Constant 0.249 0.646 0.164 0.459
(0.156) (0.232)** (0.103) (0.160)**
Observations 268 209 268 209
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.09
Current discount rate Future discount rate
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors corrected for 
clustering at the village level. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is current discount rate calculated 
from the binary choices between amount tomorrow and after three months. In columns 3 and 4 the 
dependent variable is future discount rate calculated from the binary choices between amount after one year 
and after one year and three months.  23 
Table 10: Discount rates and the number of children  
Dependent variable
All women All women All women All women All women All women All women All women All women All women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total number of children -0.044 -0.015 -0.008 -0.025 -0.005 -0.005
(0.016)** (0.019) (0.008) (0.026) (0.028) (0.007)
(Total number of children)
2 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.002)*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Children -0.093 -0.037 -0.059 -0.023




> 4 children 0.110 0.216 0.048 0.113
(0.107) (0.108)* (0.113) (0.108)
Age 2.1e-04 0.006 -0.006 0.002 -0.007 -1.0e-04 0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
(Age)
2/1000 0.003 -0.101 0.079 -0.047 0.083 -0.010 -0.078 0.031 -0.047 0.035
(0.110) (0.089) (0.120) (0.093) (0.120) (0.064) (0.068) (0.075) (0.065) (0.085)
Socioeconomic characteristics yes yes yes yes yea yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02
Future discount rate Current discount rate
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. In columns 1,2,3,4,5 the 
dependent variable is current discount rate calculated from the binary choices between amount tomorrow and after three months. In columns 6,7,8,9,10 the 
dependent variable is future discount rate calculated from the binary choices between amount after one year and after one year and three months. The variable 
"Total number of children" is all children ever born to a participant (including those who are already adult). The variable "Children" is number of children below 
18 years.  24 
Table 11: Discount rates, savings and desired education 
Low High Low High
Female
Total savings (Rs. th.) 2.078 1.669 2.165 1.530 *
(2.626) (2.414) (2.616) (2.410)
Future-oriented purpose of savings 0.646 0.500 ** 0.684 0.438 ***
(0.480) (0.503) (0.466) (0.499)
SHG participation 0.688 0.587 0.721 0.531 ***
(0.465) (0.495) (0.450) (0.502)
Desired education of first-born boy 13.116 12.593 ** 13.088 12.674
(1.756) (2.149) (1.759) (2.139)
Desired education of first-born girl 12.340 11.869 12.331 11.895
2.381 2.656 2.463 2.516
Male
Total savings (Rs. th.)  3.571 2.545 3.372 2.857
(8.412) (5.039) (6.392) (8.008)
Future-oriented purpose of savings  0.577 0.391 *** 0.514 0.480
(0.496) (0.490) (0.502) (0.502)
SHG participation 0.213 0.198 0.228 0.183
(0.411) (0.400) (0.421) (0.388)
Desired education of first-born boy 13.391 12.148 *** 13.053 12.609
(2.146) (3.026) (2.606) (2.665)
Desired education of first-born girl 12.515 11.429 *** 12.211 11.857
(2.472) (3.246) (2.711) (3.059)
Current discount 
rate
Future discount     
rate
 
Note: Means, standard deviations in parentheses. Difference of means (t-test): * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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